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Mladen Medved
The ‘Civilising Mission’ of the Austrian Passive 
Revolution (1849–1867)
Abstract: This paper examines the ideology of the Austrian passive revolution 
(the introduction and extension of capitalist social relations from above) in 
the mid-nineteenth century and reactions to it in Hungary and Croatia. Aus-
trian ideologues of the time believed that capitalism would unify the Aus trian 
empire primarily by bringing about a pan-Habsburg middle class, which 
would marginalise the potentially centrifugal effects of different nationalities. 
Indeed, this would have meant the end of the Monarchy as an empire, since 
coercion would have been rendered unnecessary in maintaining it. Eventu-
al (partial) convergence in development was conceived as a result of both the 
capitalist system and the civilizing mission of the Austrian state and German 
population. The paper argues that the universalising discourse of the 1850s 
was not matched with a corresponding political organisation that could have 
resulted in ‘moral and intellectual leadership’ (Gramsci). The political chang-
es in the 1860s better corresponded to the form of sociality referred to in the 
discourse of the Austrian civilising mission, however, the discourse itself re-
lied more heavily on Germans as bearers of civilisation while the political sys-
tem remained highly centralised. The paper demonstrates that the civilising 
discourse was rejected both in Hungary and Croatia, where the Austrian state  
was deemed too centralised and authoritarian as well as incapable of devel-
oping the periphery.
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1. Introduction
In the history of the Habsburg Monarchy, the 1850s and 1860s were marked firstly 
by centralisation comparable only to that of Joseph II, and, secondly, by the manage-
ment of a major socioeconomic transformation: the transition to capitalism. Regard-
less of some substantial modernising achievements, in earlier historiographical treat-
ments the period tended to be viewed as an overly authoritarian reaction to the events 
of 1848/49. The neo-absolutist period of the 1850s was considered to have been fol-
lowed by sham parliamentarism in the 1860s.1 The ineffectiveness of 1850s authori-
tarianism was later stressed by Harm-Hinrich Brandt in a weighty study of the peri-
od’s political economy.2 A more recent account by Ágnes Deák, focusing primarily on 
1850s Hungary, is more neutral in tone without offering an explicit argument on the 
period, while the most positive interpretation of neo-absolutism and the 1860s has 
been provided by Pieter Judson. Though constituting a “police state”, Judson believes 
neo-absolutism can be considered liberal because, like in contemporary France and 
Prussia, it implemented many liberal reforms, including “the establishment of capi-
talist relations in the countryside”. In contrast, the 1860s, in line with revisionist his-
toriography, are seen as a major step forward in constitutional life that should not be 
discarded as a mere continuation of an earlier system by different means.3 Austrian 
historiography has, on the other hand, retained an emphasis on economic reforms 
coupled with authoritarianism and political volatility.4
With some partial exceptions, such as that of Pieter Judson,5 an analysis of the 
role contemporaries believed capitalism would play in stabilising the empire after 
1848/49 has not received the attention it deserves. This paper examines the Austrian 
civilising discourse, in the sense of economic and cultural development of ‘back-
ward’ areas via Austrian agency, and reactions to it in Hungary and Croatia in the 
context of the Austrian passive revolution, that is the introduction and extension of 
capitalist social relations from above. More specifically, it demonstrates that Austrian 
ideologues of the time argued capitalism to be a social formation that would stabilise 
the Austrian empire, while the Austrian state and German population would aid the 
1 Louis Eisenmann, Le compromis austro-hongrois de 1867. Étude sur le dualisme, reimpr. of the 
ed. Paris 1904, Hattiesburg 1971; Josef Redlich, Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem. 
Geschichtliche Darstellung der inneren Politik der habsburgischen Monarchie von 1848 bis zum 
Untergang des Reiches, Leipzig 1920.
2 Harm-Hinrich Brandt, Der österreichische Neoabsolutismus. Staatsfinanzen und Politik 1848–1860, 
vol. 1–2, Göttingen 1978.
3 Ágnes Deák, From Habsburg Neo-Absolutism to the Compromise, 1849–1867, Boulder 2008; Pieter 
Judson, The Habsburg Empire. A New History, Cambridge, MA 2016.
4 Harm Hinrich Brandt (ed.), Der österreichische Neoabsolutismus als Verfassung- und Verwaltungs-
problem. Diskussionen über einen strittigen Epochenbegriff, Wien/Köln/Weimar 2014.
5 Judson, Habsburg Empire, 2016.
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development of underdeveloped regions. It shows that the discourse of the civilising 
mission was rejected in both Hungary and Croatia primarily because centralisation 
took place without a strong parliament, and because contemporaries considered the 
results of the transition to capitalism to have been meagre at best.
An examination of the civilising mission seems particularly appropriate in 
the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, which scholars see as having a similar core-
periphery structure as the capitalist world-system.6 This warrants the employment 
of the term “inner periphery” advanced by Hans-Heinrich Nolte, thereby avoid-
ing the arguably more state-centrist argumentation of Immanuel Wallerstein while 
also arguing for a more dynamic and non-linear interaction between the core and 
periphery.7 Relying on the framework of uneven and combined development, I have 
argued that state formation within the Monarchy does not correspond well to the 
image of the Monarchy as the world economy primarily because of the strong state 
formation in Hungary that culminated in the dualist arrangement of 1867. This goes 
against world-systems analysis, which assumes weaker states on the periphery, but is 
compatible with a more multilinear model as suggested by Nolte.8
However, the perspective of the world-system is heuristically useful as it brings 
up the question of the lack of correspondence between economics and politics. This 
is especially relevant for the Austrian core as a potential hegemon in the ‘Habsburg 
world-system’, which should have developed stronger state structures than Hungary. 
Yet the form of the Austrian state seemed to be inimical to hegemony for most of the 
period under examination. Indeed, it was even more authoritarian than other pas-
sive revolutions at the time. 
In the following section, I will examine the concepts of hegemony and passive 
revolution and their application to the context of the Austrian Empire. The next two 
sections briefly outline the political economy of the empire in the 1850s and 60s, fol-
lowed by a thorough discussion of the discourse of the Austrian passive revolution. 
The last section turns to Hungarian and Croatian reactions to the Austrian civilis-
ing mission discourse.
6 Andrea Komlosy, Grenze und ungleiche regionale Entwicklung. Binnenmarkt und Migration in der 
Habsburgermonarchie, Wien 2003; Jenő Szűcs, The Three Historical Regions of Europe: An Outline, 
in: Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 29/2 (1983), 131–184.
7 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System I. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York/San Francisco 1974; Hans-Heinrich 
Nolte, Internal Peripheries: From Andalucia to Tatarstan, in: Review 18/2 (1995), 261–280; idem, 
Why Is Europe’s South Poor? A Chain of Internal Peripheries along the Old Muslim-Christian Bor-
ders, in: Review 26/1 (2003), 49–66. Klemens Kaps provides a thorough and sophisticated analysis of 
Galicia as internal periphery: Klemens Kaps, Ungleiche Entwicklung in Zentraleuropa. Galizien zwi-
schen überregionaler Verflechtung und imperialer Politik (1772–1914), Wien/Köln/Weimar 2015. 
8 Mladen Medved, Trotsky or Wallerstein? Approaching the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth 
Century, in: East-Central Europe 45/1 (2018), 39–62.
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2. Hegemony, Passive Revolution and Empire 
In the literature that relies on Gramsci’s concept, the Austrian Empire is not consid-
ered a case of passive revolution (and was thus implicitly doomed by the onset of 
capitalist modernity).9 Yet an argument could be made that a passive revolutionary 
road to modernity was also characteristic of Austria’s history, though in a manner 
that significantly departs from what are considered classic examples of this revolu-
tion, such as Prussia/Germany and Piedmont/Italy.
Before discussing the concept of passive revolution, that of hegemony needs to 
be examined so that the mode of power characterising passive revolutions may be 
made clearer. Hegemony as a power relation becomes possible in capitalist societies 
because the fusion of economics and politics that characterised pre-capitalist soci-
eties is severed, and the process of the extraction of surplus is no longer as depend-
ent on political mechanisms. For Gramsci, hegemony is based on the intellectual 
and moral leadership of a social class that plays a decisive role in economic life. This 
social class is able to present its own class interests as the universal interests of the 
whole society, enabling it, unlike the pre-capitalist classes who relied on extra-eco-
nomic coercion, to achieve the consent of other classes. As Gramsci pointed out, 
the bourgeois class is acting as if it would absorb the whole of society into itself.10 
Thus, and crucially for the following discussion, although hegemony of the state and 
social groups is rooted in socioeconomic structure, hegemony is also exercised on a 
“moral, intellectual and political” plane.11
However, hegemony is not mere persuasion, as its rootedness in a hierarchical 
class society already implies. It is always backed by potential coercion that supports 
its persuasive aspect, akin, in Perry Anderson’s analogy, to gold underpinning the 
paper currency of the gold standard. The state is the ultimate guarantee of hegemo-
ny.12 Peter Thomas goes further, arguing that even in a hegemonic relationship “force 
must not appear to predominate over consent too much, but, in reality, their ‘proper 
relationship [giusto rapporto]’ involves more weight on the side of the former”.13
 
9 See the special issue of Capital & Class 34/2 (2010) on passive revolution as well as: Neil David-
son, How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions?, Chicago 2012. For general overviews of 
Gramsci’s thought and thorough discussion of passive revolution see Adam David Morton, Unrav-
elling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy, London/Ann 
Arbor 2007; Peter Thomas, The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism, Leiden 
2009.
10 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, New York 1987, 260.
11 Ibid., 59.
12 Perry Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, in: New Left Review I/100 (1976), 5–78, 32, 
43f.
13 Thomas, Gramscian Moment, 2009, 165.
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As Giovanni Arrighi, among others, has argued, hegemony also refers to rela-
tionships between states. This is particularly relevant for the Habsburg Monarchy, 
which is sometimes viewed as a replica of the capitalist world-system.14 As with 
social classes within states themselves, the hegemony of a state in the international 
system is based on its economic supremacy. A hegemonic state is able to present 
its own interest as being the same as those of the capitalist system as a whole. As a 
result of this hegemonic position, the state exercising it receives “additional” pow-
er.15 Perry Anderson adds a substantial caveat to this argument. The citizens of a 
state are under the same “cultural and legal framework” that is absent between states. 
Thus, the interaction between states is to a greater extent marked by coercion.16
Since hegemony is a combination of persuasion and coercion, it is not the com-
plete opposite of a passive revolution. Alex Callinicos usefully conceptualises pas-
sive revolution as referring to “socio-political processes in which revolution-induc-
ing strains are at once displaced and at least partially fulfilled”.17 Passive revolutions 
introduce or extend already existing capitalist social property relations from above. 
Neil Davidson argues that the conditions for the emergence of the passive revolu-
tionary road to modernity included the emergence of the class challenging capitalist 
property relations – the proletariat – and the willingness of non-capitalist agencies 
to transition to a capitalist society due to the pressures of more developed capitalist 
social formations.18 The concept of passive revolution thus refers both to class and 
geopolitical dimensions in the emergence of the “political rule of capital” and estab-
lishes a dialectical relationship between geopolitics and internal class relations.19 As 
the state inaugurates or expands capitalist social property relations, the passive rev-
olution, argues Paul Thomas, depoliticises the bourgeoisie, causing political and 
social issues to be transformed into technocratic ones.20
An extension of the concept is needed to accommodate the Austrian case. When 
Gramsci used the term ‘passive revolution’, he was referring to the creation of a 
national state as a new centre of capital accumulation, usually spearheaded by an 
14 Komlosy, Grenze, 2003; Szűcs, Three Historical Regions, 1983. 
15 Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century. Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times, New 
York/London 1994, 28f.; Giovanni Arrighi/Beverly J. Silver, Introduction, in: Giovanni Arrighi/
Beverly J. Silver (eds.), Chaos and Governance in the Modern World-System, Minneapolis/London 
1999, 27–34.
16 Perry Anderson, The Heirs of Gramsci, in: New Left Review II/100 (2016), 71–97, 96.
17 Alex Callinicos, The Limits of Passive Revolution, in: Capital & Class 34/3 (2010), 491–507, 498, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0309816810378265.
18 Davidson, How Revolutionary, 2012, 318–320.
19 Morton, Unravelling Gramsci, 2007, 69; Adam David Morton, The Geopolitics of Passive Revolution, 
in: Alexander Anievas (ed.), Marxism and World Politics. Contesting Global Capitalism, London/
New York 2010, 215–230, 217. 
20 Thomas, Gramscian Moment, 2009, 151.
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expansion of an already existing state like Piedmont. The revolution was passive as 
it was the state rather than a social group that was leading the process of political 
unification.21 The Austrian passive revolution was thus doubly passive, as an existing 
state was preserved, and capital accumulation was extended within it. And unlike 
its competitors, geopolitical changes were, for the Monarchy, a threat to the existing 
order, not the basis for a new one. This fact is not insignificant in explaining why the 
Austrian passive revolution was arguably the most passive one.
Now, there have been recent attempts led by Pieter Judson to conceptualise 
the Habsburg Monarchy as a “liberal empire”.22 Although my interpretation of the 
1850s and 60s is in fact very close to that of Judson and partly builds on his ana-
lysis, I approach the period differently. This is because the term ‘empire’ is defined 
by attempts of the political centre, relying on coercion, to integrate peripheral elites 
within a political formation. Most importantly, it is primarily a political rather than 
a social relationship. Should an empire’s societies merge into one society, coer-
cion would become redundant. For this reason, hegemonic politics in a Gramscian 
sense is a priori impossible in the context of imperial politics.23 This is not to say 
that non-imperial political units are by definition not authoritarian. Rather, they 
enable a whole gamut of state forms, from democratic to fascist, while empires can 
only be authoritarian. The issue with the newer interpretations of ‘empire’ and their 
applications to the Monarchy is the following: the management of difference and 
the political flexibility of empires are not related to specific social and political rela-
tions of pre-capitalist societies that made the management of difference possible, 
while the challenges posed to that management by capitalist social relations, emer-
gence of civil society and new forms of sovereignty are sidelined. Symptomatically, 
the concepts of modernity and nation are not considered necessary “to explain the 
course of history”.24 But there is a decisive difference between managing cultural 
diversity within, by definition, authoritarian pre-capitalist empires and within new 
polities. Pre-capitalist societies relied on extra-economic coercion for the extrac-
tion of surplus, whereas in capitalist societies firms gain the surplus in the process 
of production. Thus, in pre-capitalist societies there existed a fusion of the eco-
nomic and the political. The extraction of surplus was politically constituted. How-
21 Gramsci, Selections, 1987, 105.
22 Judson, Habsburg Empire, 2016. 
23 Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires, New York 2001; Jür-
gen Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, München 2009; 
Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. Vol 3: Global Empires and Revolution, Cambridge 2012. 
For a different view of empire that influenced Pieter Judson see Jane Burbank/Frederick Cooper, 
Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference, Princeton 2010.
24 Burbank/Cooper, Empires, 2010, 7f. See also Alan Mikhail/Christine M. Philliou, The Ottoman 
Empire and the Imperial Turn, in: Comparative Studies in Society & History 54/4 (2012), 721–745.
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ever, in capitalism, there is a (partial) separation of the economic and the political, 
which then leads to the formation of civil society and new forms of sovereignty. 
New literature on ‘empire’ downplays the enormous economic, social and politi-
cal transformations brought about by the transition to capitalism. It is therefore left 
with no plausible explanation for the rising number of political units in the modern 
era. These new forms of sovereignty are problematic for the political organisation of 
the empire as they are a political form of new social relations while the empire is a 
political formation. Had the Monarchy created a multicultural form of popular sov-
ereignty, it would have still managed difference but not as an empire.25
While non-imperial polities may be riddled with conflicts over their political 
organisation, they are less burdened by the very viability of political units. It is thus 
more probable that they might develop hegemonic politics, however shallow, as they 
can appeal to the constructed ‘people’ in a way that is hard to imagine in empires. 
This does not preclude a political unit with hegemonic politics at home to pursue 
domination in the context of an empire, which was the apparent paradox of British 
rule in India discussed by Ranajit Guha.26 However, the paradox is only apparent 
because hegemonic politics within a polity may be strengthened by domination over 
others because, as a result, internal ideological cohesion is strengthened. Returning 
to a discussion of the Monarchy, this article argues that the potential for hegemonic 
politics within it was always meagre, but that it was perhaps at its greatest between 
1849 and 1867.
3. Austrian Developmentalist Discourse in the 1850s
For the purposes of this article, capitalism is defined as competitive accumulation 
based on wage labour. Both labour and enterprises are dependent on the market for 
their reproduction. Labour thus has to sell labour power while enterprises need to 
continuously cut costs in order to achieve the average profit rate. They thus tend to 
accumulate, innovate and invest in production. There are also other forms of labour 
in the regions of the capitalist world-system. They are part of the capitalist sys-
tem if they significantly contribute to a systematic reproduction and expansion of 
 
25 I made some of these points in my review of Pieter Judson’s The Habsburg Empire: Mladen Medved, 
Habsburg Empire Strikes Back?, in: East-Central Europe 46/2–3 (2019), 358–363.
26 Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India, Cambridge, 
MA 1998.
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competitive accumulation based on wage labour and if the capitalist world-system is 
important for their reproduction.27
The so-called neo-absolutist regime abolished serfdom for good. It did this with-
out undermining peasant property to the extent that peasants would be proletari-
anised – as opposed, for example, to the English and Prussian transitions to capi-
talism  – and laid the basis for capitalist social property relations throughout the 
empire.28 There were substantial differences within the Monarchy before 1848, argu-
ably including (partly) capitalist regions, where capitalist social relations were pre-
dominant, and the majority of non-capitalist ones. More developed regions such as 
Austria and Bohemia thus had a smoother transition to capitalism than Hungary 
and Galicia. However, despite the differences between capitalist and non-capital-
ist regions before 1848, the revolutions of 1848 and the ‘neo-absolutist’ regime laid 
a firm foundation for capitalist social relations. A customs union was introduced 
in most of the Monarchy in 1850. The economic policy of the regime was, at first, 
marked by state-led industrialisation, mainly by investments in railroads, the lead-
ing sector, and later followed by private sector investment that was backed by state 
guarantees on profits. Economic development, although somewhat behind that of 
the Zollverein, was substantial.29 These reforms were implemented by a hyper-cen-
tralised government that had abolished the traditionally autonomous counties of 
Hungary and partly staffed them with bureaucrats from other provinces, leaving the 
local gentry and intelligentsia without a vital source of income.
The ideologues of the regime stressed the increased pace of growth and the 
bright future that lay ahead. The level of progress achieved in just a couple of years 
of neo-absolutism, wrote the head of the state statistical office, Carl von Czoernig 
(1804–1889), was previously “hardly conceivable”, making the Austria of ten years 
ago look as if it belonged in the eighteenth century. These positive developments 
resulted in the complete trust of the citizens and “capitalists” in the capabilities of the 
new state, Czoernig argued.30 Uneven development within the Monarchy was not 
seen as a problem due to the levelling tendencies of capitalist relations of produc-
tion. Furthermore, state infrastructural projects and credit institutions facilitated 
the opening of even the most backward areas to the benefits of the market economy, 
while peasants freed from the constraints of serfdom started making better use of 
27 Alexander Anievas/Kerem Nisançioglu, How the West Came to Rule, London 2015; Neil Davidson, 
We Cannot Escape History, Chicago 2015.
28 John Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union. Economic Development in Austria-
Hungary in the Nineteenth Century, Princeton 1983, 91; Harm-Hinrich Brandt, Der österreichische 
Neoabsolutismus, vol. 1, 1978, 285. 
29 Brandt, Der österreichische Neoabsolutismus, vol. 1, 1978, 275.
30 Carl Freiherr von Czoernig, Oesterreich’s Neugestaltung, 1848–1858, Stuttgart/Augsburg 1858, 27, 
IV, 128–130.
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the land. The agricultural schools set up by the state ensured that producers were 
familiar with the best practices. Landlords who no longer relied on serf labour opted 
only for the best methods of production to survive in this competitive environment. 
The links between agriculture and industry grew, ensuring rising productivity. And 
capital flowed naturally and in abundance into agriculture in order to take advantage 
of this favourable economic environment.31
The capacity of the peoples of the monarchy to take up the opportunities offered 
by the new system was also not seen as particularly problematic. Czoernig repre-
sented peoples who were deemed semi-barbarous as being capable of development, 
including the much-despised Habsburg Slavs whom Engels saw as merely provid-
ing assimilation material for Germans and Hungarians.32 Not denying the immense 
geographical and cultural differences in the Monarchy that could boast with having 
the diversity of the entire globe within its borders, Czoerning stressed that cultural 
difference presented a source of vitality rather than being an obstacle to the march 
of civilisation. Even Germans stood to gain from other cultures. But according to 
Czoer nig, the main pillars of the regime were nonetheless the dynasty and the mili-
tary.33
In what sounds like an echo of the Communist Manifesto, the journalist and pub-
licist Ernst von Schwarzer (1808–1860) argued that people were being freed from 
the “shackles of space and time”.34 This also meant, however, that the “omnipotence” 
of “dry numbers” was forcing every country to further material progress in order to 
remain a great power, Austria being no different in this respect, particularly since 
she began doing so later than others.35 According to Schwarzer, the varying levels of 
development within Austria were immense. There were areas where people lived like 
“semi-civilised Indians” and in Hungary one found “Oriental conditions”. However, 
the less developed peoples clearly had the potential for civilisation. Indeed, they 
benefited from the fact that they are part of a community with more civilised peo-
ples, which ensured that they were also civilised. And in this march towards civilisa-
tion the less developed peoples did not repeat the same path of the developed ones 
but rather skipped over stages of development.36 Schwarzer asserted that if she ful-
filled her potentials, Austria would emerge as a “phoenix from the purifying flames” 
31 Ibid., 120, 472–478.
32 Friedrich Engels, Sieg der Konterrevolution zu Wien, in: Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke, vol. 5, 
Berlin, GDR 1959, 457; idem, Der magyarische Kampf, in: Marx/Engels, Werke, vol. 6, Berlin, GDR 
1961, 168–176; idem, Der demokratische Panslavismus, in: ibid., 279.
33 Ernst von Schwarzer, Geld und Gut in Neu-Oesterreich, Wien 1857, 21.
34 Schwarzer, Geld und Gut, 1857, 2.
35 Ibid., 8, 15.
36 Ibid., 19, 22.
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of her rejuvenation.37 Even Austria’s existing accomplishments showed, contrary to 
claims of naive leftist propaganda, that any “state form” was capable of fostering 
development.38 One of the greatest achievements of this regime was the fact that the 
English path was not taken. Pauperism was intentionally avoided.39 Nonetheless, a 
little more liberalism in “new Austria” would be wise, Schwarzer concluded.40
Both Czoernig and Schwarzer marginalised a new form of society capitalism was 
engendering, which made their contribution more compatible with the form of the 
Austrian state at the time. It was Lorenz von Stein (1815–1890), recommended by 
the ministers Leo von Thun (1811–1888) and Karl Ludwig Bruck (1798–1860) for 
a professorship of political economy at the University of Vienna,41 who provided a 
theory of the Austrian passive revolution and opened the door to the contradiction 
that Schwarzer and Czoernig had sidelined. He implied that a change in the mode of 
rule was necessary to accommodate social relations of the new order.
Not only was the monarchy compatible with capitalism, but it was the only po -
litical form that could overcome the class conflicts that are inevitable in a capita list 
society, claimed Stein. Similarly to Hegel,42 Stein argued that the laws of capitalist 
accumulation generate class conflicts. The society is the realm of domination, while 
the state represents the principle of freedom, its interest being the development of all 
its subjects. The social inequalities of civil society, however, can endanger the princi-
ple of freedom represented in the state since the ruling class might capture it for its 
own benefit.43 It is here that the monarchy enters the scene, since only the monarch 
can present the principle of the state in its purest form, and preside over the class 
conflicts of capitalist society, preventing the domination of the ruling class.44 Only 
by relying on power coming from outside of its own social relations could capitalist 
societies achieve stability. The state could then proceed to stem class conflict by pre-
venting proletarianisation.45 Since the state towered above all classes, Stein believed 
the Monarchy was ideally positioned to lessen class conflicts.46
37 Ibid., 205. 
38 Ibid., 8–10. Proudhon and Fourier are ridiculed in these passages.
39 Ibid., 33.
40 Ibid., 203f.
41 Dirk Blasius, Lorenz von Stein. Deutsche Gelehrtenpolitik in der Habsburger Monarchie, Kiel 2007, 
40.
42 Frederick Beiser, Hegel and Hegelianism, in: Gareth Stedman Jones/Gregory Claeys (eds.), The Cam-
bridge History of Nineteenth Century Political Thought, Cambridge 2011, 110–140, 125.
43 Lorenz von Stein, The History of the Social Movement in France, 1789–1850, ed. by Kaethe Mengel-
berg, Totowa 1969, 57f.
44 Lorenz von Stein, Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung in Frankreich von 1789 bis auf unsere Tage, vol. 
3, Leipzig 1850, 17. 
45 Stein, History, 1969, 70.
46 Blasius, Lorenz von Stein, 2007, 45. 
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Regarding uneven development, Stein did not only discuss the overcoming of 
local isolation in the order of capital but also how this new social system binds 
classes into a new, productive and more encompassing form of power that was to 
be a source of renewal of the Monarchy. Writing at the end of the Crimean War, 
Stein characterised it as marking a turning point in international relations where 
war between developed nations had been abolished. The relatively backward Rus-
sia that had nothing to give to Europe had been defeated. The civilising mission of 
Europe in the Balkans had thus fallen on Austria’s shoulders.47 The reason Austria 
could achieve this, and why it was fundamentally different from Russia, lay in the 
opposition between an economic and political relationship. The latter captured “the 
whole at a stroke” but did not overtake it, while the former worked its way up to 
the whole and overtook it through and through. The domination of former civilisa-
tions in history was “mechanical” while contemporary civilisation was interiorised.48 
This is why the stakes in international relations were higher than ever. As Stein put 
it elsewhere: “The struggle of peoples with the sword is only a struggle for tempo-
rary domination; the struggle of peoples with their economies is the true struggle 
for life and death.”49 But from Stein’s discourse it is clear that Austria would not end 
up on the losing side of this process, since the “absolute and cosmopolitan” laws of 
the political economy seem to have worked in favour of the relatively developed 
Monarchy.50 Indeed, they inevitably augmented the Monarchy’s power. The inexo-
rable tendency of capital to expand meant that all current relations would soon be 
profoundly transformed and the seemingly impossible would emerge.51 After going 
over into eastern parts of the Monarchy and ensuring economic progress there, capi-
tal would spread outside its borders and bring about Austrian hegemony in South-
eastern Europe.52 Austria’s hegemony over this area would be assured by the fact that 
this new form of power was not an end in itself, as was the case in the previous his-
torical systems, but rather a mode of power that reflected the needs of and developed 
in harmony with the economy.53
In Stein’s discourse the power of capital to expand is so overwhelming that no 
cultural barrier seems capable of resisting it. Indeed, Stein, Schwarzer and Czoernig 
seem to agree that within the Monarchy uneven development would not present a 
serious problem and no colonial-type dependencies would emerge. As Carl Schmitt 
47 Lorenz von Stein, Oesterreich und der Frieden, Wien 1856, 2f., 13f., 42f.
48 Ibid., 77, 42f.
49 Lorenz von Stein, System der Staatswissenschaft, Stuttgart/Tübingen 1852, 464.
50 Ibid., 79.
51 Ibid., 55f.
52 Ibid., 79f., 65–68.
53 Ibid., 88f.
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noted, regarding Stein, the general categories used to analyse the political economy 
of the Monarchy, categories whose reference was the more developed West, were ill-
suited for capturing the variegated social landscape of the Monarchy.54 They were, 
however, quite useful as an ideological statement where the capitalist mode of pro-
duction is operating without being interfered with by the different social structures 
and (emerging) national identities within the Austrian Empire. In fact, those iden-
tities and social structures were to be absorbed by the juggernaut of capital while 
the emperor would keep the potentially unpleasant class conflicts at bay and gain 
the consent of the middle classes. Stein’s ideas on uneven development are nonethe-
less either underdeveloped or contradict his analysis of the levelling tendencies of 
the capitalist mode of production. The main elements of Stein’s international politi-
cal economy are “economic geography” (directly influenced by Johann Heinrich von 
Thünen) and “economic ethnography”, the first dealing with spatial patterns of the 
economy, and the latter with the capacities of people to develop.55 As Fernand Brau-
del pointed out, von Thünen’s model stressed “inequality” between different zones 
of economic activity.56 It is not quite clear how the two aspects of unevenness under 
capitalism that Stein emphasised were to be applied to the Monarchy and its envi-
ronment. But in any reading, they seem to suggest an Austrian/German hegemony. 
Indeed, it is precisely when the most “cosmopolitan” aspects of the capitalist political 
economy were stressed that flirtation with the particular seemed most frequent and 
the German element seemed to incarnate general laws of the modern economy. This 
contradiction emerged in full force in the 1860s. Beyond contradictions in the devel-
opmental discourse, there were also contradictions between the developmental dis-
course and the state form. A strong implication of Stein’s developmental discourse 
was that the new sociality needed to find a more adequate political expression.
4. 1860s: Parliament and Hegemony
Yet the regime started to be shaken not in the realm of politics, but in the sphere that, 
for the ideologues of the Austrian passive revolution, was marked by linear progress: 
the economy. Mobilisation for the Crimean War wreaked havoc on state finances 
and was followed by the 1857 slowdown. State railroads were sold to investors at a 
bargain. Issued bonds were partly forced on the population, which was a blow to the 
54 Carl Schmitt, Die Stellung Lorenz von Steins in der Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, in: Schmollers 
Jahrbuch 64 (1940), 641–646.
55 Stein, System der Staatswissenschaft, 1852, 456–460.
56 Fernand Braudel, The Perspective of the World: Civilisation and Capitalism 15th–18th Century, vol. 
3, Berkeley 1992, 38f 
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legitimacy of a regime that prided itself on effective management of the economy.57 
Foreign investors asked and received less protection for Austrian industry, while 
landlords also had numerous complaints, citing lack of credit, high taxation of agri-
culture and low tariffs for colonial sugar.58 Over-centralised credit provision and the 
absolutist state itself were criticised even by some Austrian chambers of commerce 
as curbs on growth.59 Economic woes were accompanied by geopolitical ones, the 
defeat in 1859 against Piedmont and France finally forcing the regime to consider 
erecting representative institutions. Indeed, the only form of representative institu-
tion in the 1850s was the chambers of commerce, which were modelled on France.60
However, the emperor’s decision for a new course included a radical volte-face 
in the form of the 1860 October Diploma, according to which the Monarchy was 
to be federalised on a conservative basis. The reins of the state were once more to 
be given to the aristocracy, with domination of the most illustrious among them – 
the Hungarian one. However, as the Hungarian historian László Péter has pointed 
out, the October Diploma turned out to be a “spectacular fiasco”.61 The narrow class 
basis of this system was astonishing, as the Hungarian aristocracy could not even 
politically control its own society. Furthermore, the German bourgeoisie protested 
against what it saw as revival of feudalism and the strengthening of Hungary.62
Somewhat embarrassingly, this Diploma was called an “irrevocable law” of the 
empire but was replaced within months by the February Patent, which was uncon-
vincingly presented as its continuation so as not to endanger the authority of the 
crown.63 Now the empire finally received a representative body that could examine 
the budget, and approve new taxes and sale of state assets, again with the motiva-
tion to assuage the rickety financial markets and public opinion that did not find the 
October Diploma sufficient. The government relied on the German bourgeoisie and 
great landowners, in whose favour the electoral system was rigged.64 The more lib-
eral state paved the way towards a coherent Austrian bid for hegemony. Major ideo-
logical articulations of this period show a lesser contradiction between the new soci-
57 C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918, New York 1979, 472.
58 Brandt, Der österreichische Neoabsolutismus, vol. 1, 1978, 302–305, 323f., 417, 474, 588.
59 Haupt-Bericht der Handels- und Gewerbekammer für das Erzherzogthum Oesterreich ob der Enns 
für die Jahre 1857, 1858–1859, Linz 1860, 97; Haupt-Bericht der Handels- und Gewerbekammer für 
das Erzherzogthum Oesterreich ob der Enns für die Jahre 1860, 1861 und 1862, Linz 1863, 16–20.
60 Macartney, Habsburg Empire, 1979, 460, fn 3.
61 Lászlo Péter, The Aristocracy, the Gentry and Their Parliamentary Tradition in Nineteenth-Century 
Hungary, in: Slavonic & East European Review 70/1 (1992), 77–110, 94.
62 Eisenmann, Le compromis, 1904/1971, 250–521; Redlich, Das österreichische Staats- und Reichs-
problem, 1920, 467.
63 Lothar Höbelt (ed.), Österreichs Weg zur konstitutionellen Monarchie. Aus der Sicht des Staatsmi-
nisters Anton von Schmerling, Frankfurt am Main 1994, 78.
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ality and state form, while still retaining a rather authoritarian outlook. However, 
another major contradiction is introduced: a greater role of the German population 
in stabilising the empire, thus reducing the universal appeal of the discourse.
Finance minister Karl Ludwig Bruck argued that the new state organisation 
should not be seen as sign of defeat, but rather one that would invigorate the Monar-
chy’s potentials and overcome political tensions. The role of capitalism and civil soci-
ety in providing the basis of rule now came to the fore. Far from providing a restraint 
on imperial power, capitalism might actually have been the source of its renewal. The 
truly conservative and patriotic Mittelstand, which was not governed by ‘passions’ but 
by an instinct for stability and moderate solutions, might have become the main pillar 
of the Empire. While this was the time to rely on the Mittelstand and involve it within 
the new mode of rule, the politics of neo-absolutism instead weakened and alienated 
this social strata. The government needed the consent of its people, it had to rely on 
the classes of the new social order. Development was thus on the side of the Gesamt-
staat, while backwardness encouraged centripetal forces.65
However, Bruck was aware that this class was not so strong outside of the most 
developed parts of the Empire. How could the state then rely on it? The notion of the 
levelling tendencies of the capitalist mode of production within the Monarchy per-
vades Bruck’s text, but the workings of the benevolent abstract market are facilitated 
by one group: the Germans. Although Bruck noted that both Italians and Czechs 
had achieved high levels of development, it was on strong German shoulders that 
the “civilising mission” of the Monarchy, as Bruck put it, stood.66 Here, international 
relations come back into the picture. In Bruck’s view, not only capital but also work-
ers from the German Confederation should come to the Monarchy, which he called 
a “German state”, and “fertilise” its unused resources, “awaken” the less developed 
people from their slumber. The peoples of the Monarchy could turn to only one 
source for their development: the German culture. The links with Germany thus 
had to be stronger, so that the most developed element was thereby strengthened 
and the country further opened to the benefits it brought with it.67 By permeating 
the less developed parts of the Monarchy, Germans would ensure the emergence of 
“higher culture”.68 But, according to Bruck, this did not mean Germanisation. Other 
peoples could preserve their languages. Indeed, plurality of cultures may be benefi-
cial to development. Crucially, they should be imbued with German culture, which 
would transform them into supporters of the Gesamtstaat.69
65 Carl Ludwig Freiherr von Bruck, Die Aufgaben Oesterreichs, Leipzig 1860, 36–42, 61f., 94.
66 Ibid., 58, 47.
67 Ibid., 15, 17–21, 61f. 
68 Ibid., 48.
69 Ibid., 20f., 61–63.
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This was not an unusual position to take. F. B. Schwarz, in his Ungarn und 
Amerika, argued that all nationalities, save for Italians, were dependent on German 
culture for their development, this being their only source of ‘higher civilisation’. Of 
course, this would not mean Germanisation, he claimed. German ideas needed to 
be appropriated, and local languages should be developed for that to occur. This, 
however, was coupled with characterisations of Hungary as the “America” next door, 
where Europe was in a position to “conquer a new part of the world”.70 A similar view 
was expressed by Ludwig Oppenheimer (1843–1909), an industrialist and liberal 
member of parliament, who argued that the peoples of Hungary could develop in 
any area as along as their link with German culture and tradition was not broken.71 
The task of the state was to “develop its nationalities“ and to “bring German spirit 
and culture to the most inhospitable parts of Galicia, and the most remote pusztas 
of Hungary”.72 This was made much more likely by the new form of the Austrian 
state, which would no longer be “governed by the principles of Rome”. By throwing 
“away its mental shackles” it would “make itself the master of capital”.73 Julius Frö-
bel (1805–1893), a revolutionary sentenced to death in 1848, became advisor on the 
reform of the German Confederation and believed that stronger connections with 
Germany were perhaps the only viable way for Austria to continue with its civilising 
mission. The lack of such a bond might leave Austria too weak to fulfil her role in 
Southeastern Europe, and she might succumb to domination of the Slavs and Mag-
yars, to the Eastern Rohheit.74
Advisor to the emperor Johann Perthaler (1812–1862) was one of the main 
architects of the new political system.75 He shared Bruck’s sentiment regarding Aus-
tria’s civilising mission.76 Perthaler offered a political solution that he believed would 
capitalise on the potentials of civil society. By becoming constitutional and form-
ing a central parliament, the Monarchy would be able to overcome particular inter-
ests. The local diets would become a mere disaggregated Reichsrat and members 
of it imbued with the interest of the “whole”.77 This constitution would automati-
cally draw in all the nationalities of the Monarchy, except, at first, rebellious Hun-
gary, whose political programme was antiquated anyway. Perthaler contrasted the 
70 F. B. Schwarz, Ungarn und Amerika oder Oesterreich und Deutschland, Wien 1863, 20f., 15.
71 Ludwig Oppenheimer, Ueber die Leitung der deutschen Auswanderung nach Ungarn, Leipzig 1866, 
6.
72 Ibid., 7. 
73 Ibid., 6. 
74 Julius Fröbel, Oesterreich und die Umgestaltung des deutschen Bundes, Wien 1862, 40–48.
75 Höbelt (ed.), Österreichs Weg, 64f.
76 Johann Ritter von Perthaler, Das Erbkaisertum Kleindeutschland, Frankfurt am Main 1849.
77 Johann Ritter von Perthaler, Neun Briefe über Verfassungs-Reformen in Österreich. Vom Verfasser 
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87OeZG 31 | 2020 | 2
“world-historical progress” that the Monarchy guaranteed with the anachronistic 
constitution of Hungary, which was antithetical to the interests of the bourgeoisie 
and peasants.78 Being an inconsequential minority of a great empire, Hungarians 
were expected to realise the impossibility of resistance and the benefits of partaking 
in the “whole”, a word Perthaler zealously repeats.
Despite a greater emphasis on the importance of the German population, in this 
more hegemonic version of the ideology of the Austrian passive revolution a hope 
was expressed that a pan-Habsburg Mittelstand would emerge. This would unify the 
Monarchy via a new, more capillary form of power. As Louis Eisenmann argued, 
a belief emerged that the order of capital would relegate identity differences to the 
sidelines of society and politics,79 putting class in the saddle as the primary deter-
mination of social relations. Since it ensured the capitalist order and was located in 
one of the most developed parts of the Monarchy, this would therefore bind all capi-
talist classes to the imperial centre. The further capitalism develops, the more stable 
the empire would become. Indeed, had this program been achieved, Austria would 
have ceased being an empire as it would have exercised hegemony. Since all regions 
would have willingly been part of the Monarchy, the definition of empire would not 
have applied.
However, the new government was still a far cry from the liberal ideal. The 
Reichsrat could only examine the budget, rather than vote it down. The relation-
ship between the executive and legislative was undefined, and there was no ministe-
rial responsibility, nor immunity for members of the Reichsrat. According to article 
13, the government could also rely on “emergency legislation”. The emperor defined 
what the Imperial Council was to discuss, appointed its president and could adjourn 
or dissolve it. Of course, he retained absolute powers in foreign affairs and as the 
supreme commander of the army.80
5. Reactions to the Austrian ‘Civilising Mission’  in Hungary and Croatia
Anton von Schmerling’s (1805–1893) government (1860–1865) was immediately 
faced with a Hungarian boycott. The legacy of the October Diploma came back to 
haunt him because it had revived the counties that were now used against the cen-
tralist government. Not only did Hungary refuse to send its representatives to the 
78 Ibid., 7. 
79 Eisenmann, Le compromis, 1904/1971, 279–299.
80 György Szabad, Hungarian Political Trends between the Revolution and the Compromise (1849–
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Reichsrat but it also refused to pay taxes, which led to considerable tax arrears and 
use of the military in tax collection. The regime had so little political capital that the 
political leaders of the nationalities, who had previously clashed with Hungary, were 
now turning to it to protect themselves from Vienna. The Hungarian critique of 
centralisation certainly rang true for the nationalities, who thought that they might 
have a greater chance at preserving some autonomy within the Hungarian King-
dom. Crucially, Hungarians did not merely warn of the political dangers of centra-
lised rule but also criticised the economic performance of the regime. They tried to 
undermine the civilising discourse emanating from Vienna.
Emil Dessewffy (1814–1866), a leading figure of the Hungarian conservatives, 
fired a salvo of accusations against the economic performance of the 1850s. Not 
neglecting the problems of the transitional period from feudalism to capitalism, it 
was the state that he found wanting in leading the way to a new society. According to 
Dessewffy, the problematic situation Austria found itself in was a consequence of a 
problematic bank system, state deficits and the difficulties caused in 1848, which had 
destroyed the “overall condition” of the Monarchy. The problem with the banking 
system was that there were no limits on the emissions of paper money. Rather than 
a bank of the entire Monarchy, the central bank was Viennese, and its branches did 
not have sufficient funds nor were they adequately managed. These policies made 
it difficult to adapt to the “sudden transition from the natural to money economy”. 
A radical solution was needed, and that was to end the oversupply of money and 
tie it to metal value. The central bank simultaneously had to change its policies and 
become decentralised. Branches of the central bank did not provide sufficient funds, 
and, as a consequence of too much centralisation, the bank was not informed of the 
situation on the periphery. He also feared that institutions such as Crédit Mobilier 
would place their capital primarily in industry, bonds and speculation.81
Menyhért Lónyay (1822–1884) adopted many of Dessewffy’s arguments and for-
mulated a more thorough and stinging critique. He can be considered the financial 
expert among the Hungarian political elite and would be the first finance minister of 
Hungary and later prime minister. Lónyay stated that Austrians might believe that 
they were bringing benefits to the “backward, barbarian Hungary” but the system 
of neo-absolutism was killing all economic initiative. After mentioning that Hunga-
ry’s backwardness was to be explained by the fact it was treated as a “colony” by the 
Austrians, who intentionally wanted to prevent the material wellbeing of an inde-
pendent-minded state, he continued that under neo-absolutism belated compensa-
tion for landlords, introduction of foreign laws unsuitable for the country, instability 
of the currency, heavy taxes, passive trade balance, flow of state’s interest payments 
81 Emil Desewffy, Über die schwebenden oesterreichischen Finanzfragen, Pest 1856, 1–3, 10, 32, 91f.
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outside of the country, and lessening of capital formation due to deficits were ham-
pering growth. Positive aspects included the abolition of internal customs and rail-
road construction, but this was also undercut by the state, which did little to stimu-
late agriculture, particularly wine that could be an important export item. With the 
exception of Mongol and Turkish campaigns, security of property and person had 
not been in a worse condition. Education of the population was made impossible 
due to the use of a foreign language (German). Judiciary was less efficient in many 
areas. Materially, the land had regressed, with the landlord class burdened with debt 
and usury, and with taxes crowding out private investment. To make matters worse, 
the state treated the enormous taxes it raises wastefully, using much of the revenues 
to deal with high deficits.82 Like Dessewffy, Lónyay argued that agricultural credit 
institutions with cheaper credit needed to be set up, and that the state should have 
turned to solid finances.83 Communications also needed to be improved. Lónyay 
criticised the favouring of Trieste, arguing that it was inconceivable for an empire of 
36 million to have only one port. Fiume should have been connected to Hungary.84 
But the main cause of this difficult position was, Lónyay concluded, that those with 
interests contrary to the development of Hungary were exercising decisive influence 
over it.85 For Lónyay it was self-governance that was the basis of material progress.86 
Neo-absolutism was thus inherently incapable of furthering it. This was also one of 
the main criticisms of Ferenc Deák, the leader of what was to become the party that 
made the Settlement. Deák argued that the form of the state was contrary to eco-
nomic development.87
Despite criticisms, the 1860s period in Hungary was characterised by a grow-
ing sense of optimism that was underpinned by a solid performance of the Hungar-
ian economy. After a few difficult years, Hungarian agriculture picked up its pace. 
One of the main reasons for this was railway construction, which greatly benefited 
western Hungary.88 A striking feature of this railroad planning is that it almost com-
pletely corresponded with the plans of the Hungarian Reform Era. Indeed, many 
lines went through Pest,89 where a successful milling industry was being developed 
based on the previous accumulations of merchant capital.90 Despite Schmerling’s 
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scepticism, who feared greater autonomy of Hungary, Hungarian credit institution 
came into existence in 1862.91 Considering the lack of labour, Hungarian agriculture 
had a more modern character, with a greater importance of machinery and steam 
engines.92 Sándor Konek (1818–1882), an author of a statistical overview of Hun-
gary, argued that Hungary was well-positioned to become the “granary of Europe”, 
and Tokai wine was already “world-renowned”.93 Gyula Schnierer (1832–1902), in 
his book on custom reform in the Monarchy, praised the virtue of free trade, rep-
resenting Hungary as an integral part of an increasingly interconnected world mar-
ket.94 While economic development could bring confidence to Hungarian resistance, 
that resistance now took a different form. The growing economic interdependence, 
noted Schnierer, also brought a greater political one.95 The victory of free tradism 
was also a sign of defeat of a more revolutionary politics that was expressed in pro-
tectionism. The Address Party of Deák, rather than the Hungarian left, became 
dominant in Hungarian politics.
There was, however, no optimism regarding development in Croatia, an ally of 
Vienna in 1848/9. Indeed, by comparison Hungarian criticism of Vienna may have 
been milder. What members of the National Party, who were closest to potential 
allies of the regime, highlighted in their speeches in the Sabor – the Croatian Parlia-
ment – was highly indicative. For Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski (1816–1889), a historian 
and one of the leading figures of the party, German culture proved itself not as a civi-
lising force but an enemy of freedom, imbued with a desire for domination. He con-
sidered the treatment of the population of the Military Frontier to be unacceptable, 
which, even after 1848, was forced to provide disproportionately high military ser-
vice. The Frontier, argued Kukuljević, gave more to the “throne and empire than all 
the other Austrian provinces” and yet it experienced “more misery and burdens than 
any other people of the empire”.96 In an address to the king, Franz Joseph, issued by 
Zagreb County, it was stated that people in the Frontier were worse off than slaves in 
the American South, living under an oppressive system with numerous obligations, 
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and taken like animals to the “slaughterhouse” for the benefit of Austria. This was an 
institution “unworthy” of the nineteenth century.97
The assessment of Austrian policy in the rest of Croatia was also far from posi-
tive. Some of the most important thinkers on political economy at the time, Imbro 
Tkalac (1824–1912) on the left and Lazar Hellenbach (1827–1887) on the right, 
agreed that Austria had no right to describe its activity in the region as that of a 
civilising mission. Tkalac argued that there was an economic basis for the civilis-
ing mission in the East: “You are naming your thirst for money a ‘world-historical’ 
calling in the East”. And although it was a “national dogma” in Germany that the 
“poor” and “wild barbarians” needed to be civilised, Germans themselves were mak-
ing weak, hesitant steps towards modern political life.98 In the reports he had writ-
ten for the Agram/Zagreb Chamber of Commerce, Tkalac expressed hope that Aus-
tria might help Croatia to overcome what he considered a debilitating legacy of feu-
dalism.99 Yet he concluded that Austria had failed in that task. When it came to the 
political economy of the Austrian Empire as a whole, Tkalac considered it “undis-
puted” that stronger economic connections were important for the stability of the 
Empire, but argued that these must be accompanied by political reform. He argued 
that one should be:
“[…] free of the error of those who believe that they can reimburse politics 
bereft of freedom and spiritual progress with the development of material 
relations […]. We believe that spiritual and material progress, political and 
economic freedom, condition each other, and that through the effort to iso-
late both moments, both must wither away to the disadvantage of the state.”100 
Although at first optimistic about Schmerling’s government, hoping that it meant a 
turn towards modern political life, he became ever more critical of it. The supposed 
task of bringing “‘German culture’” to the East meant in plain German to Germanise 
the East, Tkalac maintained. He argued that the government became convinced that 
only Germans could keep the heterogeneous elements of the Monarchy together 
and thus decided to strengthen them.101 What he perceived were failures of Austria’s 
management of the transition to capitalism, the authoritarian mode of rule and the 
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favouring of Germans, led Tkalac to argue that Austria as a state could not be refor-
med, and should be brought down in a revolution. It was up to the people of Aus-
tria to “tear down and destroy this last rampart of medieval feudality based on the 
will of one man, on the domination of one family and the slavery of others […]”.102
Arguing from a far more conservative perspective, albeit with strong social-
ist and anarchist influences, Lazar Hellenbach stated that Austria’s problem lay in 
the fact that capital was both in a “ruling” and “privileged” position. On the other 
hand, landlords were struggling, facing high taxation, lack of credit and competition 
from areas with forced labour. Hellenbach opposed state aid to industry, arguing 
that there was a possibility of funds being misallocated.103 Like his Hungarian coun-
terparts, Hellenbach complained about the lack of credit. Every crownland should 
have its own bank in order to stimulate agricultural production, managed, naturally, 
by the landlords themselves. Prussia was, as was often the case, the exemplary state 
here. Industry had the potential to rise with growing agricultural production, and 
even if it did not the trade balance would be improved, thus also resolving the cur-
rency problems that the Monarchy had experienced. Furthermore, as the example 
of England showed, this constituted the most natural path.104 Hellenbach was very 
critical of the centralised political system, the rule of bureaucracy and the military, 
and called for the decentralisation of the state. State bureaucracy was, in Hellen-
bach’s classification, part of the unproductive proletariat, whose numbers needed 
to be reduced to a minimum due to its potential to threaten the material flourish-
ing of the state. And the overly centralised Austrian state was engaging in too high 
a military expenditure. Considering all this waste, he ironically noted that Austri-
ans are bearers of civilisation in the East.105 Moreover, he later added, the Austrian 
state was far behind the needs of the time. The October-February Institution, as he 
called it, came too late as nationalism had already alienated the nationalities and 
pushed them closer to liberal Hungary. This institution did not even have the form 
of a liberal constitution. And it was marred by inconsistency, with centralisation 
in the West and decentralisation in the East. In conclusion, it was neither central-
ist, dualist nor federalist, and certainly not liberal. It was opposed to progress and 
bound to fail.106 
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Thus, starting from different points of view, major thinkers of political economy 
at the time arrived at similar conclusions about the political economy of the Aus-
trian passive revolution. These criticisms were also broadly similar to those articu-
lated in Hungary. Their reflections demonstrate how difficult it was for the Austrian 
state to attain consent from allies, let alone rebellious Hungary. Moreover, this was 
even hard to achieve in the case of an ideal subject such as Tkalac, a middle class lib-
eral on the periphery who was at first convinced that Austria indeed did have a civi-
lising mission on the periphery of the empire. Importantly for future historiography, 
the hyper-centralised mode of rule tended to obfuscate local, endogenous limits to 
economic development that, arguably, were in place for centuries, well before the 
relatively short-lived “neo-absolutist” period. By “outsourcing” the causes of under-
development to an external agency, i.e. that of Austrian “colonial” policy, the feudal 
roots of underdevelopment were marginalised. This led to the conclusion that only 
local management of the economy could lead to economic development and that, 
therefore, political decentralisation was necessary.
6. Conclusion
Austria was undergoing its own version of a passive revolution (the extension or 
introduction of capitalist social relations from above) in the 1850s and 1860s. The 
developmentalist discourse of the Austrian passive revolution was articulated in the 
idiom of a ‘civilising mission’. An emphasis was placed on the agency of the Aus-
trian state in bringing about capitalist social relations and pulling the Monarchy 
into modernity. The Austrian state was also supposed to enable less developed peri-
pheries to catch up with the core and, thus, lay the social basis for a pan-Habsburg 
middle class that would strengthen imperial unity. During the 1850s, there was a 
major discrepancy between the discourse of economic progress and the hyper-cen-
tralised and authoritarian Austrian state.
This discrepancy lessened in the 1860s, as the empire had a parliament in Vienna. 
However, in the 1860s greater emphasis was placed on the Austrian/German popu-
lation as the key element in bringing about development to the periphery, and Aus-
trian connections with the German Confederation were stressed. This lessened the 
universal appeal of Austrian developmentalist discourse. Due to a central parlia-
ment, the new government of the 1860s had a greater potential for hegemonic poli-
tics: political, moral and intellectual leadership exercised by class/state that occupies 
a privileged position in the socio-economic structure or the core-periphery struc-
ture of the world-system. This leadership results in the consent of the governed, and 
the hegemon thus receives additional power. But the Austrian state was still a far 
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cry from a “proper relationship” (Gramsci) between the state and civil society that 
is at the core of hegemonic politics. Hegemony over other areas of the Monarchy, 
made more difficult by complex state formation within the Monarchy, was thus not 
achieved.
The discourse of a civilising mission had little purchase in Hungary and Croa-
tia, where Austrian rule was perceived mostly as a system of political domination 
rather than hegemony. Hyper-centralisation and authoritarianism were particu-
larly resented. Defeated in 1848/49, it was expected that Hungary would politically 
oppose a centralised empire. However, Hungarian critique went beyond politics and 
stressed that the Austrian state, both in the 1850s and 1860s, was incapable on deliv-
ering on its promises of development. This criticism had appeal beyond Hungary, 
as peripheries of the empire faced similar developmental and political problems. 
Although Croatia was an Austrian ally in 1848/49, the Croatian assessment of polit-
ical economy was even bleaker than the Hungarian one. The Austrian civilising dis-
course was seen as more of a cynical politico-ideological strategy than a genuine 
commitment to developing the periphery. Given hyper-centralisation, Austria was 
considered to be responsible for virtually all developmental woes, while endoge-
nously generated backwardness was neglected.
